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JURISDICTION
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals on December 18,
1996. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 44, the Court of Appeals transferred the appeal to the
Utah Supreme Court because it is taken from an order, judgment or decree of a district court
in a civil case, not involving domestic relations. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 42, on May 15,
1997, the Utah Supreme Court returned the appeal the Court of Appeals.
QUESTION FOR REVIEW
In interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-105(2) (1994) according to its plain and
ordinary meaning, did the district court correctly hold that § 31A-21-105(2) allows an insurer
to rescind a policy based on the insured's innocent or unknowing misrepresentations which
are material and relied on by the insurer, or which contribute directly to the loss, thereby
properly granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Mutual Protective Insurance
Company?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews a district court's conclusions of law in support a grant of
summary judgment for correctness, according no deference. Schurtrz v. BMW of N. Am..
Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-105(2) is determinative of this appeal:

1

(2)
Except as provided in subsection (5), no misrepresentation or breach of
an affirmative warranty affects the insurer's obligations under the policy unless:
(a)
The insurer relies on it and it is either material or is made with
intent to deceive; or
(b)

The fact misrepresented or falsely warranted contributes to the

loss.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment of
defendant/appellee Mutual Protective Insurance Company ("MPIC") on the breach of
contract claim of plaintifffappellant C. Stanley Derbidge, personal representative of the estate
of Esma S. Seymour. In support of its motion for summary judgment, MPIC argued that
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-105(2), it was entitled to void an insurance policy issued
to Mrs. Seymour because of Mrs. Seymour's material misrepresentations regarding her
medical history on the insurance application. The district court granted MPIC's motion,
holding that

§ 31A-21-105(2) allowed rescission for innocent or unknowing

misrepresentations which are material and relied on by the insurer, or which contribute to the
loss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are undisputed. In June 1989, Mrs. Seymour met with Vaughn J. Lewis, an
MPIC representative, to complete an application for disability insurance. See Initial Pretrial
Order ("IPTO"), ^ 4 (R. at 47). The application inquired whether Mrs. Seymour, in the past

2

five years, had received medical advice or treatment, taken any medications, been confined
to any hospital and/or nursing facility or consulted with a physician for any of several
enumerated conditions, including "high blood pressure" and "Organic mental disease or
disorder (such as Alzheimer's Disease)." IPTO, Tf 5 (R. at 47). Mrs. Seymour answered yes
only with respect to high blood pressure, but answered no to all other listed conditions,
including the question concerning "Organic mental disease or disorder (such as Alzheimer's
Disease)." LcL The application also asked whether, other than as set forth previously, Mrs.
Seymour had been hospitalized within the last five years. Mrs. Seymour answered no. Brief
of Plaintiff/Appellant C. Stan Derbidge ("Appellant's Br.") at Addendum 3.
Based on this application, a long-term care policy was issued by MPIC to Mrs.
Seymour, effective July 16, 1989. IPTO, f 9 (R. at 50-51). Part K(l) of the policy read as
follows:
(1) Entire contract; changes: this policy, with any
attachments (and the copy of your application), is the entire
contract of insurance. No agent may change it in any way. Only
an officer of ours can approve a change. That change must be
shown in the policy.

14
Part K(2) of the policy reads:
(2) Time limit on certain defenses: After two years from
the policy date, no misstatements, except fraudulent

3

misstatements in the application for the policy, can be used to
void the policy or to deny a claim for loss incurred or disability
commencing after the expiration of such two year period.

LI
Less than six months after the insurance policy became effective, Mrs. Seymour
submitted proof of loss, claiming that she required semi-skilled care in a nursing facility from
January 3, 1990 forward for an indefinite period because of Alzheimer's disease. IPTO, p.
2 (R. at 45). After MPIC received Mrs. Seymour's claim, it requested and obtained Mrs.
Seymour's medical records which revealed that in November 1985, she was hospitalized to
evaluate and treat a problem of "mental obtundation with memory impairment." Mrs.
Seymour's records also revealed that this condition continued from 1985 forward. IPTO, ffif
6, 7(a)-7(i) (R. at 47-50). Mrs. Seymour was hospitalized again in 1988 for chest pain.
During this hospitalization, Mrs. Seymour's attending physician again noted her problems
with memory impairment and mental confusion, and made a diagnosis of probable organic
brain syndrome. IdL
On the application for insurance, Mrs. Seymour did not reveal either her 1985 or 1988
hospitalizations, her past memory impairments and mental confusion or her diagnosis of
probable organic brain syndrome. IPTO, ^ 5 (R. at 47). On February 28, 1990, MPIC
voided Mrs. Seymour's policy because in her application for insurance she failed to disclose
facts regarding her memory impairment and organic brain syndrome/Alzheimer's disease
which, if disclosed, would have resulted in MPIC's denial of her application. IPTO, ^f 10 (R.
4

at 51). These undisclosed facts contributed directly to Mrs. Seymour's claim for nursing
home care because of Alzheimer's disease.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 31A-21-105(2) provides three separate grounds for rescission of an insurance
policy by an insurer based on a misrepresentation by the insured, including 1) where the
insurer relies on the misrepresentation and it is material; or 2) where the insurer relies on the
misrepresentation and it is made with intent to deceive; or 3) where the fact misrepresented
contributes to the loss. These grounds for rescission are disjunctive, not conjunctive, and an
insurer need only prove one ground in order to rescind the contract. Only the "intent to
deceive" prong of the statute requires a knowing or intentional misrepresentation. An insurer
may rescind a policy based on an innocent or non-intentional misrepresentation where it is
material and relied on, or where it contributes to the loss. Here, it is undisputed that MPIC
relied on material misrepresentations in issuing the long-term care policy to Mrs. Seymour,
and the material misrepresentations contributed to the loss. Moreover, MPIC did not waive
its rights under the statute. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment
in favor of MPIC under § 31A-21-105(2).
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ARGUMENT
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE PURSUANT TO
§ 31A-21-105(2), AN INSURER MAY VOID A POLICY BASED ON AN
INNOCENT OR UNKNOWING MISREPRESENTATION WHERE IT
IS MATERIAL AND RELIED ON OR WHERE IT CONTRIBUTES TO
THE LOSS.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-105(2) provides three separate grounds for rescission of

an insurance policy by an insurer because of misrepresentations by the insured:
(1)

The insurer relies on the misrepresentation and it is material; or

(2)

The insurer relies on the misrepresentation and it is made with intent to

deceive; or
(3)

The fact misrepresented contributes to the loss.

These grounds for rescission are disjunctive, not conjunctive. The insurer need only
prove one of them in order to invalidate the policy. See Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life
Ins. Co.. 723 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1986) (holding that three prongs of § 31A-21-105(2) are
disjunctive).1 The statute allows for rescission of a policy for a misrepresentation that is
1

See also Model Utah Jury Instructions - Civil 21.1 (1993 ed.):

CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH MISREPRESENTATION
APPLICATION WILL VOID INSURANCE COVERAGE.
The failure to disclose information or the affirmative
misrepresentation of information on an insurance application
will void coverage under the insurance policy if:
1.
The insurer relies on the omission or
misrepresentation and the nondisclosed or misrepresented fact
is material to the insurer; or

IN

(continued...)
6

material either to the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed without having to show
any intent to deceive on the part of the insured. The state of mind of the applicant is
therefore irrelevant where (1) the insurer relies on the nondisclosed or misrepresented fact
and it is material or (2) the nondisclosed or misrepresented fact contributes to the loss.
It is undisputed that in the application Mrs. Seymour failed to disclose her significant
medical history of progressive mental impairment and mental confusion and her diagnosis
of probable organic brain syndrome, including her hospitalization for memory impairment
in 1985. IPTO,ffl[5- 7(a)-(i), (R. at 47-50). Mrs. Seymour also failed to disclose that she
was hospitalized again in 1988 for chest pain, and that during this hospitalization, her doctor
noted her continuing difficulties with memory impairment and confusion, and made a
diagnosis of probable organic brain syndrome. Id.
It is undisputed that MPIC issued the insurance policy to Mrs. Seymour in reliance
on the accuracy of the medical history and information provided in her application. It is also
undisputed that if MPIC had been made aware of Mrs. Seymour's medical history of
progressive memory impairment and mental confusion and the diagnosis of probable organic

(...continued)
2.
The insurer relies on the omission or
misrepresentation and the applicant's omission or
misrepresentation was made with an intent to deceive the
insurer; or
3.
The fact omitted or misrepresented contributed
directly to the loss for which coverage is claimed.
7

brain syndrome when she applied for the long term policy, the policy would not have been
issued. IPTO,f 10 (R. at 51).
Here, the district court correctly granted summary judgment because the undisputed
facts show that Mrs. Seymour misrepresented facts which were material, on which MPIC
relied, and which contributed to the loss. Thus, as a matter of law MPIC was entitled to void
the policy under the first and third alternatives of § 31A-21-105(2).
On appeal, appellant argues that the district court incorrectly granted summary
judgment because the term "misrepresentation" as used in the statute requires a knowing or
intentional misrepresentation, and a factual dispute exists regarding whether Mrs. Seymour
intentionally or knowingly misrepresented her medical history of mental impairment and
organic brain damage. See Appellant's Br. at 8-17. However, this argument fails as
appellant's interpretation of the statute is untenable.
First, this interpretation renders the "intent to deceive" prong of the statute redundant.
Utah case law requires that, if possible, a statute be read in a way that gives effect to all of
its provisions. In re Richard Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996) ( "In analyzing a
statute's plain language, we must attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and
independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms''^: Olympia Sales Co. v. Long.
604 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah 1979) ("We conceive it to be our duty, if possible, to adopt that
interpretation which will give effect to each provision and harmonize them with each
other, so that neither will be meaningless."). Section 31A-21-105(2) is disjunctive, offering
8

three alternatives under which a policy may be voided. Only the second alternative requires
a misrepresentation made with "intent to deceive"; the first and third alternatives have no
scienter requirement. If, as appellant contends, the term misrepresentation requires a
knowing or intentional misrepresentation for all three alternatives, the second alternative's
requirement of "intent to deceive" would be meaningless.2
The evolution of the current statute demonstrates that appellant's interpretation is
incorrect. Earlier versions of the statute explicitly required "intent to deceive" by the insured
in all cases before the insurer could rescind. See Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8 (1953) (repealed
1963). However, the statute was completely rewritten in 1963 to provide for three separate
alternatives under which an insurer could rescind the policy, only one of which required an
intentional misrepresentation.3

2

Appellant seems to suggest, without explanation or support, that the intent to deceive
prong is not redundant as it requires a "fraudulent" misrepresentation, as opposed to simply
a knowing misrepresentation. See Appellant's Br. at 14. However, Appellant does not
explain how a "fraudulent" misrepresentation differs from a knowing or intentional
misrepresentation. In fact, under Utah law a fraudulent misrepresentation is one that the
defendant knew to be false or that the defendant made recklessly. See e ^ , Model Utah Jury
Instructions - Civil 17.1 and 17.2 (1993 ed.).
3

As amended in 1963, the statute allowed rescission for misrepresentation that was 1)
fraudulent; or 2) material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by the
insurer; or 3) the insurer would not have issued the policy if the true facts had been known.
See Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8 (1974) (repealed 1986). In 1985, the statute was amended
to its present form. The disjunctive structure and the basic categories of the statute were
retained, but the "fraudulent" prong was replaced with the current "intent to deceive" prong.
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-105(2).
9

Appellant argues that the current version of the statute must be read to include a
knowing or intentional element because a knowing misrepresentation was required by
common law, and "the statute has not been expressly changed, which would be required for
legislation in contravention of the Common Law . . . ." Appellant's Br. at 12. Appellant
misstates the law. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1996) provides:
[T]he rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish the
laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and
all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the
objects and to promote justice.
Finally, while appellant cites a number of cases, almost all of them predated the 1963
amendments to the statute, and thus provide no support for his argument.4 In fact, the only
cases decided since the 1963 amendments to the statute suggest, consistent with MPIC's
position, that only the "intent to deceive" prong requires an intentional misrepresentation.
In Berger, the Utah Supreme Court held that the post-1963 statutory alternatives "are stated
in the disjunctive, not the conjunctive.

In order to invalidate a policy because of a

misrepresentation by the insured, the insurer need prove applicable only one of the above
provisions." 723 P.2d at 390.
The only case Appellant cites interpreting the current version of the statute — Hardy
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America. 763 P.2d 761 (Utah 1988) -- supports MPIC's
4

E.g.. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society. 108 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1940); Wootton
v. Combined Ins. Co. of America. 395 P.2d 724 (Utah 1964); Chadwick v. Beneficial Life
Insurance Co.. 191 P. 240 (Utah 1919).
10

interpretation as it confirms that the intent to deceive prong is only one of several alternatives
that allow an insurer to void a policy under § 31A-21-105(2):
[T]he insurer must prove that the misrepresentation was made with the intent to
deceive or that the matter misrepresented was material or that the insurer in good faith
would not have issued the policy if the true facts had been made known to the insurer.

Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
Under the clear terms of the statute and the undisputed facts, the district court
correctly granted summary judgment in this case.

Mrs. Seymour made material

misrepresentations on the application, and those misrepresentations were relied on by MPIC
and they contributed to the loss. The district court's entry of summary judgment for MPIC
must be affirmed.5
II.

THE TERMS OF THE APPLICATION DO NOT WAIVE MPIC'S
RIGHTS UNDER § 31A-21-105.
Appellant argues that even assuming the statute does not require an intentional

misrepresentation, MPIC has contractually agreed to void policies only for an intentional
misrepresentation. Appellant's Br. at 8-10. Appellant's argument is based on a section of
the application which contains a certification by the applicant that the information provided

5

Appellant suggests that an insurer could prevent the "problem" created by
misrepresentations on insurance applications through better and more thorough underwriting
practices. Appellant's Br. at 10-11. This policy argument is not persuasive, and more
importantly, it does not change MPIC's right to rescind under § 31 A-21-105(2).
11

in the application is "true, full and complete to the best of [the applicant's] knowledge and
information." Appellant's Br. at Addendum 3.
Appellant's argument fails under the language of the contract and the principles of
waiver. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Pasker. Gould, Ames &
Weaver v. Morse. 887 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah App. 1994). Part K(2) of the policy, quoted
above, provides that for the first two years nonfraudulent or innocent misrepresentation in
the application can be used by MPIC to void the policy or deny the loss. This policy
provision alone makes clear that MPIC did not intentionally relinquish its statutory right to
void a policy for an insured's material misrepresentation. The language on which Appellant
relies, which is standard to most insurance contracts, is merely a certification that the
applicant has answered truthfully; it does not mean that intentional misrepresentation is
required before the insurer can void the policy. Appellant's argument that such standard
language is a waiver of MPIC's right to void the policy pursuant to the terms § 31A-21105(2), particularly in light of the policy language to the contrary, is unsupportable.

12

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the district court's order granting MPIC's motion for
summary judgment should be affirmed.
DATED this |~f*day of July, 1997.

DAVID B. WATKISS
CAROLYN COX
BRETT J. DelPORTO
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS, P.C.
Broadway Centre, Suite 800
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2304
(801)530-1500
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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